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I. INTRODUCTION
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, consisting of Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules,' has been adopted, with some
variations, by several jurisdictions in the United States. 2 The Code sets forth
* This Comment received the 1996 Donald S. Teller Memorial Award as the second
year writing that contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal. The author
would like to thank his wife, Julie Johnson, and his family for their support and
encouragement.
I The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public,
with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts
from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived. See Thomas
S. Brown & M. Jane Goode, Conflicts of Interest in Subrogation Actions, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 16, 17 n.2 (1986) (citing preliminary statement to MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REspoNsIBiLrry (1980)).
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of
principles upon which a lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations. See id.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character.
The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action. See id.
2 See id. Ohio adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility on October 5,
1970. See OHIO CLE INST., REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
PROGRAM CPR 1 (1990). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was originally
adopted in 1969. See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Lawyers' Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1:301 (Oct. 9, 1991).
The Model Code was amended several times, with the last set of amendments adopted
in 1980. See id. In August 1983, the ABA drafted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
See id. Although several states still follow the Model Code, the majority of states now base
their ethics rules on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. A partial listing of the
states which have revised their ethics rules in accordance with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct appears in the ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct.
See State Ethics Rules, Lawyers' Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1:11 (Jan. 21, 1987).
This Comment will focus on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as it has
been adopted in Ohio. The crux of the Note's analysis is centered on two Ohio ethics
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the various duties and responsibilities that each practicing attorney must follow,
and subjects attorneys who violate its rules to potential discipline.3
Consequently, the Code stands as the ethical cornerstone of the legal profession
and exists to provide guidance to attorneys on their professional
responsibilities. 4
One issue that the Code specifically addresses is an attorney's multiple
opinions and therefore, emphasis has been placed on the Model Code. The text of the
Model Code, however, is very similar to the text of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct as it pertains to the conflict of interest issues specifically addressed in this
Comment. See RICHARD A. ZrrRN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LErGAL ETmCS IN THE
PRACncE OF LAW (1995) (discussing Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which is the general rule that addresses conflict of interest situations, and comparing it to
DR 5-101 and DR 5-105, which are the Model Code counterparts to Rule 1.7). An in-depth
comparison of the similarities and differences between the Model Code and the Model
Rules can be found in the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct. See
generally ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Lawyers' Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 1:101-1:182 (Feb. 21, 1996); see also ZrrR]N& LANGFORD, supra.
It is also important to note that the American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. See ALl Approves Almost Half of Restatement
on Lawyers, Lawyers' Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1:170 (May 29, 1996). The
proposed Restatement sets out, for the guidance of the legal profession and courts, the law
on lawyers' obligations and rights in eight categories including regulation of the lawyer-
client relationship and regulation of conflicts of interest. See id. at 1:171.
Unlike state ethics rules, which are designed to serve as disciplinary codes setting forth
statements of standards of civil litigation, the Restatement (while overlapping many of the
topics found in ethics codes) is intended by the ALI to state the law applicable to resolution
of such civil proceedings as legal malpractice actions, qualification motions, and fee
disputes. See id. The nearly decade-long project is scheduled for completion in May 1997,
but there was speculation at this year's meeting that approval of the Restatement may not
actually reach its conclusion until 1998. See id.
3 Some of the disciplinary actions that may be taken against an attorney who violates
the Code are: (a) suspension of license to practice law, (b) removal of license to practice
law (disbarment), and (c) the imposition of penalties in the form of monetary fines. See
L.C. Di Stasi, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Representation of Conflicting Interests
Subjecting Attorney to Disciplinary Action, 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1995); see also lack A.
Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study,
Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 947 (1994) (providing a
good analysis of a typical disciplinary action against an attorney and the procedural process
involved from start to finish).
4 This statement is supported by the fact that a majority of the states have adopted
some form of either the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Lawyers' Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1:301 (Oct. 9, 1991); Lawyers' Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 1:11-1:46 (Jan. 21, 1987).
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representation of adverse or partially adverse parties. 5 An attorney may be
asked to represent two clients who have conflicting or potentially conflicting
interests. Certain situations where these conflicts commonly occur are specified
in Ethical Consideration 5-17 which states, "Typically recurring situations
involving potentially differing interests are those in which a lawyer is asked to-
represent co-defendants in a criminal case, co-plaintiffs in a personal injury
case, an insured and his (her) insurer, 6 and beneficiaries of the estate of a
decedent." 7
As stated by EC 5-17, one area which abounds with conflict of interest
problems and disputes is insurance defense work. An attorney employed by an
insurer to represent an insured may be confronted with serious conflicts of
interest almost from the very beginning of the relationship.8 These conflicts
5 See Brown & Goode, supra note 1, at 16.
6 An attorney's representation of the insured and his insurer may not always be a two
client situation. For example, the situation may be viewed instead as the attorney
representing a single client, the insured, with the insurer paying the attorney's fees. DR 5-
107 and EC 5-22 address this issue. DR 5-107(A) states that a lawyer may not accept
compensation for his legal services from one other than his client except with the consent of
his client after full disclosure. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
107(A) (1980). DR 5-107(B) states that the person making payments (the insurer) shall not
direct or regulate the attorney's judgment in representing his client (the insured). See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBILrrY DR 5-1071B) (1980). EC 5-22 warns
against having a third party (the insurer) pay for services because it may conflict with the
attorney's responsibility to his client (the insured). See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPoNsIBiLrTYEC 5-22 (1980).
Although this alternative situation may arise, it appears that the representation of the
insured by the insurer's in-house counsel (the subject of this Comment) is more of a two
client situation due to the fact that the in-house attorney is already an employee of the
insurer. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INsuANcE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FuNDAmENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DocrRwNEs, AND COMrmRCIAL PRACrIcES, 827-28
(1988); see also infra note 12 for a further explanation of the in-house counsel versus
outside counsel distinction.
7 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-17 (1980).
8 See KEETON & WrDISS, supra note 6, at 829-30. Some examples of conflicts of
interest include: (1) the possibility that the third party's claims against an insured are not
covered by the applicable liability insurance (e.g., the insured may have committed an
intentional tort which is not covered under the insurance policy, and thus, it is in the
insurer's best interest to prove that an intentional tort was committed; it is in the insured's
best interest, however, to prove that only an act of negligence occurred which would still be
covered under the insurance policy); (2) claims in excess of the applicable limits of the
liability coverage (e.g., when the amounts sought by several claimants exceed the available
insurance coverage, the interests of the insured and the insurer may differ with respect to
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may be particularly problematic in insurance defense representation because of
the conflicting economic and professional allegiances. 9 Usually the conflict
faced by the lawyer is that of accommodating the interests of the insurance
company in reducing its costs by limiting the scope of its coverage obligations
while promoting the interests of the insured to receive the maximum benefits
recoverable under the insurance policy.10 With these inherent conflict of
interest problems constantly confronting insurance defense attorneys, at least
one author has been inspired to refer to insurance defense work as "an
impossible task"11 for lawyers.
Representative of the difficulties faced by insurance defense attorneys in
handling conflict of interest problems is a dilemma which tests the boundaries
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This dilemma involves the
proper scope of representation by an in-house counsel12 employed by an
the allocation of the available insurance coverage to various claimants);
(3) misrepresentation by an insured as to the claim (e.g., insurer may decide that the insured
has not been telling the truth about the events that are relevant to a third party's claim
against the insured). See id. at 812-21.
Some situations, however, are such that it should be possible for the attorney to
represent both the insured and the insurer after giving complete disclosure and obtaining the
fully informed consent of both the insured and the insurer. See id. at 833-34. Relatively
minor conflicts of interest which may allow for joint representation of the insured and the
insurer by an attorney include subrogation claims and claims involving collection of the
deductible. See id. at 219-21, 834.
9 See JACK A. GrrTENBERG & LLOYD B. SNYDER, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY iN OHio 108 (1992). The text provides an excellent summary of how such a
conflict may arise:
An insurance defense attorney's long-term client is the insurance company. A long-term
relationship depends on the lawyer performing to the expectations of the insurance
company. The lawyer may feel compelled to offer the insurance company information
obtained from the insured that will limit the company's liability or to couch settlement
recommendations in a manner that protects the company from a future bad faith claim.
Conversely, the lawyer has a professional obligation to the insured. She may try to keep
information from the insurer or to color settlement recommendations in favor of the
insured. In either event, the lawyer is trying to serve two masters with potentially
conflicting interests.
Id.
10 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 428 (1986).
11 John F. Larkin et al., Misery, Malpractice, and Mail Fraud: Lawyers' Professional
Liability in the 90s, C641 ALI-ABA 295, 297 (1991) (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responribilityfor Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1171 (1954)).
12 For clarification, an insurance company's salaried attorneys are often referred to as
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insurance company. The issue is whether the in-house counsel should represent
both the insured and the insurer. It is a relatively recent ethical issue which has
divided authorities across the nation 13 and which has raised more questions
than it has answered. Further, it is an issue which has left lawyers with little
guidance on how to approach the ethical problems that surround it.
Ohio is one state that has found this dilemma to be particularly perplexing.
In a little more than a year's time, The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline14 has considered, on two separate
"in-house counsel." Attorneys in a private practice retained by insurance companies to
represent insureds are commonly referred to as "outside counsel." See The Supreme Court
of Ohio Board of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 95-14, at 2 (1995)
[hereinafter Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14]. Many insurance companies have started employing
in-house counsel as opposed to seeking outside counsel due to the sheer volume of litigation
that insurance companies are involved in and the advantages of having these attorneys
present for legal advice on a full-time basis.
Several distinctions can be made between in-house counsel representation and outside
counsel representation. When an insurer decides to have in-house counsel appear on behalf
of an insured in defense of a tort claim covered by the insurance policy, conflicts of interest
are certainly no less intense, and may even be greater than those that exist when an insurer
selects an outside counsel to defend the claim. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 6, at 827.
Obviously, counsel who is a salaried employee of an insurance company has added
relationships which enhance the prospects of a subjective bias in favor of the insurer
because the in-house counsel is financially dependent on one client, the insurer. See id. at
827 n.19 (citing Ronald E. Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 1986
DEFENSE COUNs. J. 108-23). Such considerations as advancement in salary and
advancement in position influence in-house counsel in their decisionmaking. See id.
Consequently, control ultimately lies with the insurer (employer) because the in-house
counsel wants to satisfy the insurer (client). See id. This situation creates a risk for conflict
when the insurer's interests diverge from the interests of the insured. See id.
Although these inherent conflicts of interest confront in-house counsel, strong reasons
exist for an insurer to select in-house counsel as opposed to outside counsel to represent the
insured. See id. at 827. For example, the insurer may desire to select in-house counsel
based on the belief that these attorneys are in a better position to develop substantial
expertise in insurance defense through the repeated handling of particular types of liability
coverage and that this experience could be particularly helpful in the defense of claims that
arise under unusual or very specialized types of situations. See id.
13 Compare In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 329-30 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that
in-house counsel for the insurance company may represent individual insureds in legal
matters arising under the company's policy) with Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 341
S.E.2d 517, 523 (N.C. 1986) (holding that in-house counsel for the insurance company may
not represent the insured in an action brought by a third party for a claim covered by the
terms of the insurance policy).
14 Advisory Opinions of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline are
informal, nonbinding opinions in response to prospective or hypothetical questions
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
occasions, the proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed
by an insurance company.15 On the first occasion, the Board stated that an in-
house counsel employed by the insurance company may not represent the
insured. 16 On the second occasion, the Board reversed its position on the issue
and stated that an in-house counsel employed by the insurance company may
represent the insured. 17 With these conflicting opinions, it is obvious that the
Board has had a difficult time in dealing with the ethical and legal questions
that this issue raises. Due to this difficulty, an Ohio attorney is still left with
only questionable guidance on her professional responsibilities in the area of
insurance defense.
Given the inconsistent opinions in Ohio over this issue, combined with the
overall division across the nation, it should be considered whether the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility adequately addresses the ethical issues
raised in the context of insurance defense representation. This Note will answer
this question through the following three-part analysis. First, it will examine
the specific provisions in the Code pertaining to the conflict of interest issues
arising in insurance defense work, as well as the duties and responsibilities the
Code creates for a practicing attorney. Second, it will analyze the Ohio Board's
opinions regarding the scope of representation for an in-house counsel
employed by an insurance company in order to (a) decide which opinion makes
the proper interpretation of the Code, (b) discuss decisions in other states
concerning this issue, and (c) set out the possible implications of these
decisions on the Code. Third, since the Code has not dealt specifically with the
proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed by an
insurance company, this Note will propose a model provision which should be
added to the Code to help provide some clearer guidelines to attorneys on their
ethical responsibilities in dealing with this issue.
regarding the application of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of
Ohio, the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Attorney's Oath of
Office. See generally OHio SUP. CT. Gov. BAR R. V § 2(C).
15 See The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline,
Op. 94-9 (issued on August 12, 1994) [hereinafter Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9]; Ohio
Discipline Op. 95-14 (issued on December 1, 1995). These two opinions were issued only
sixteen months apart.
16 See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9, at 5. Specifically, the in-house counsel was barred
from attempting to collect deductibles from tortfeasors on behalf of an insured party. See id.
17 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 6. Specifically, the in-house counsel was
permitted to attempt to collect deductibles from tortfeasors on behalf of a consenting insured
party. See id.
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II. THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Four provisions found within the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility raise conflict of interest issues relevant to insurance defense
representation. These provisions are EC 5-17 and Canon 9, which deal
generally with conflict of interest issues, and DR 5-101 and DR 5-105, which
deal more specifically with these issues. 18 As discussed previously, EC 5-17
highlights the fact that insurance defense work is a situation where conflicts of
interest are prone to occur. 19 Because these conflicts are inherent in insurance
defense representation, an attorney must carefully analyze each case to
determine the extent to which the lawyer's professional judgment will be
affected by any differing interests. 20 EC 5-17 provides little more than general
guidance, but it does make it reasonably clear that if the lawyer's allegiance is
slanted in any direction, it must be slanted in favor of the insured, and not the
insurer.21
Another provision that only provides general guidance on this issue is
Canon 9, which states that "[a] Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
18 Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is the Model Rule's
counterpart to these Model Code provisions. See ZrrmN & LANGFORD, supra note 2, at
128.
19 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-17 (1980). While EC 5-
17 provides a specific listing of situations where conflicts of interest may occur, Canon 5
and EC 5-14 of the Code state the reasoning why such a conflict poses a problem. See
GUTTENBERG & SNYDER, supra note 9, at 109 n.80. Canon 5 states, "A Lawyer Should
Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY Canon 5 (1980). This rule is made more specific by EC
5-14, which states:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes
his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is
asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such
interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 5-14 (1980).20 See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 429; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21 See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 429 (referring to footnote 23 of EC 5-17); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY EC 5-17 (1980). The American Law Institute
debated this point at their most recent meeting in May 1996 with no clear resolution. See
ALI Approves Almost Half of Restatement on Lawyers, Lawyers' Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 1:171 (May 29, 1996).
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Professional Impropriety." 22 Canon 9 exists to prohibit conduct that casts
doubt upon the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. 23 The avowed
purpose of this directive is to promote public confidence in our legal system
and in the legal profession. 24
The more specific provisions of the Code which deal directly with conflict
of interest situations are DR 5-101 (specifically paragraph A) and DR 5-105. 25
2 2 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 9 (1980). This provision is
usually referred to as the appearance of impropriety rule. See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at
3. 23 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 3.
24 See Brown & Goode, supra note 1, at 19 (referring to the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, EC 9-1 and 9-2).
25 Specifically, DR 5-101 states:
DR 5-101 REFUSING EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE INTERESTS OF THE
LAWYER MAY IMPAIR HIS INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-101 (1980). Specifically, DR 5-105
states:
DR 5-105 REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONTINUE EMPLOYMENT IF THE
INTERESTS OF ANOTHER CLIENT MAY IMPAIR THE INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT OF THE LAWYER
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to extent permitted under DR 5-
105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and
if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
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The most often implicated Disciplinary Rule concerning conflicts of interest,
DR 5-105, sets forth the circumstances under which an attorney must decline
or discontinue multiple employment.26 An attorney "must decline or
discontinue multiple employment if the exercise of his or her professional
judgment is likely to be adversely affected by such employment, or if such
employment would be likely to involve him or her in representing differing
interests." 27 An exception to this rule allows the attorney to maintain joint
representation if it is obvious that the attorney can adequately represent the
interests of each client and the clients consent to the multiple representation
after full disclosure. 28 Overall, these conflict of interest rules exist to promote
and protect the duty of loyalty which must be present in each attorney-client
relationship.2 9
IIIL LAWYERS' DuTIEs, RESPONSIBRMES, AND LiABumrs UNDER THE
CODE
A. Duties and Responsibilities
The provisions of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility discussed
in Part LI anticipate conflict of interest problems for attorneys in insurance
defense work. The existence of such conflicts entail significant problems and
risks for attorneys. 30 The duties and responsibilities of the attorney when
confronted with such a conflict are dictated by the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and relate to the attorney's relationship with both the insured
and the insurer.31
As the Code states, the attorney must endeavor both to anticipate and to
recognize actual conflicts of interest.32 This means that an attorney needs to use
professional expertise, as well as considerable care, in deciding whether a
possible conflict may exist.33 Once an attorney becomes aware that a conflict or
a potential conflict of interest exists, the attorney must inform the insured and
with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.
MODEL CODE OF PROF sIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980).
26 See Brown & Goode, supra note 1, at 17.
27 Id. The author is referring to DR 5-105.
28 See id. at 18. The author is referring specifically to DR 5-105(C).
29 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 3.
30 See KETON & WiDISs, supra note 6, at 830.
31 See id.
32 See MODEL CODE OFPROFESSIONAL RESPONsmIIrrY DR 5-101 (1980).
33 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 6, at 830.
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the insurer of all the facts and circumstances relating to the conflict.3 4 This
information is provided so that the parties have the opportunity to seek
independent counsel, 35 an option that the attorney must explain to the parties.36
At this point, after the insured and insurer have been informed of the
conflicts, the attorney may still seek joint representation 37 of the parties. 38 This
3 4 See id. at 831-32; see also Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 715
(1984) (stating that an attorney has a duty "to 'protect his client in every possible way,' and
it is a violation of that duty for the attorney to 'assume a position adverse or antagonistic to
his client without the latter's free and intelligent consent given after full knowledge of all the
facts and circumstances.'"); Yeomans v. All State Ins. Co., 296 A.2d 96, 99 (NJ. Super.
Ct. 1972) (citing Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 115, 120-21 (5th Cir.
1970)), affd 324 A.2d 906 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1974); Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496
S.W.2d 552, 558 (rex. 1973) (stating that "[i]f a conflict arises between the interests of the
insurer and the insured, the attorney owes a duty to the insured to immediately advise him
of the conflict.").
There is "a duty of fair and full disclosure between insured and his insurer," and
where, as here, the insurer undertook to represent its insured, its duties included
apprising the client of settlement opportunities within a reasonable time after they were
presented; it entailed the duty to warn the client of difficulties which the litigation posed
for him wherever such difficulties were not included within the contract of indemnity; it
included the duty to advise the client of the outcome of the litigation and of any
particular procedures which might lessen its financial impact upon him; and it included
the conduct of settlement negotiations in good faith to the interests of the insured
wherever those interests might be divergent from the interests of the insurance
company.
Yeomans, 296 A.2d at 99.
35 See KEETON& WIDISS, supra note 6, at 831.
36 See GUTTENBERG & SNYDER, supra note 9, at 111.
3 7 The attorney must be careful here in pursuing joint representation. DR 5-105(C)
states the requirement that it must be "obvious" that an attorney can represent both interests.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsiBILry DR 5-105(C) (1980). Courts have
stated that "obvious" must be assessed in reference to an objective standard under which the
ability of the attorney to represent adequately the interests of each client is "free from
substantial doubt." Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1981); City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Home, 571 F. Supp. 965, 971 (C.D. Utah 1983)
(stating that the "obvious" standard must be assessed in relation to whether the lawyer
possesses substantial doubt that each client can be adequately represented).
38 See GUTrrENBERG & SNYDER, supra note 9, at 111. The insured, however, is
generally not informed of the potential conflicts that may arise from joint representation of
both the insured and the insurer by an attorney because the insured often consents to the
conflicting representation in advance through the insurance contract. See id. This advanced
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reality means that certain situations39 still exist where the conflicting interests
are such that it would be possible for an attorney to represent the insured after
making a complete disclosure, and obtaining the fully informed written consent
of the insured and the insurer. 40 Although these situations for dual
representation may arise, the attorney should advise the parties with conflicting
interests that some courses of action that might otherwise be available to the
parties and the attorney might be precluded by the joint representation. 41
If the attorney decides to undertake joint representation of both the insured
and the insurer, the attorney must balance the respective interests of the parties
consent raises some definite concerns with the insurance contract and the rights that the
insured may forfeit when signing his or her particular insurance policy.
Insurance contracts are prime examples of adhesion contracts. See William Mark
Lashner, Note, A Conmon Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in
the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1982). Adhesion
contracts are standard form contracts, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by one party
(e.g., the insurer) to a second party with much less bargaining power (e.g., the insured).
See id. at 1178. These contracts are not negotiated agreements. See id. at 1179. The offeree
lacks power to bargain for the terms of the agreement and is often unable to find
significantly different terms with another offeror. See id. In no other type of adhesion
contracts are the dangers to consumers, due to the contracts' adhesive nature, potentially so
damaging than in the insurance contract. See id. at 1177. Provisions, such as consenting to
dual representation by an attorney of both the insured and the insurer, and exclusions often
are supplied unilaterally by insurers and are unknown to the insureds. See id. Consequently,
the insured may be unknowingly giving up her right to seek separate representation by a
different attorney because she was not properly informed by the insurer, at the time the
insurance contract was signed, of the potential conflicts that may arise when an insurance
company's attorney jointly represents both the insurer and the insured.
39 Many situations exist where dual representation is inappropriate; at times, the
conflicts of interest are so great that the attorney can not possibly represent the interests of
each client adequately (e.g., representing both the husband and the wife in a heated custody
battle for their children as part of a divorce proceeding). Therefore,
mhe attorney who undertakes to represent parties with divergent interests owes the
"highest duty" to each to make a "full disclosure of all facts and circumstances which
are necessary to enable the parties to make a fully informed decision regarding the
subject matter of litigation, including the areas of potential conflict and the possibility
and desirability of seeking independent legal advice."
Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 716 (1984) (quoting Klemm v. Superior
Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 901 (1977); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d
579, 590 (1974); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 147-49 (1968)).
40 See KaMON & WIDISS, supra note 6, at 833; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONsmmrrEyDR 5-105(C) (1980).
41 See KEaTON & WiDiss, supra note 6, at 833.
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while making sure that his duty to one party does not hinder the interests of the
other party.42 Several courts have held that the attorney's duty to the insured
takes precedent over the attorney's duty to the insurer. 43 On the other hand, if
the attorney decides that the conflict is so significant that it precludes
representation of both the insured and the insurer, the attorney should withdraw
from the representation of the insured. 44
B. Lawyer's Liabilities Under the Code
The attorney occupies a fiduciary relationship to the insured, as well as to
the insurance company. 45 As a result of this special relationship, an attorney
may be subject to liability for harm resulting from conduct in relation to
conflicts of interest between the insured and the insurer.46 This principle is
evidenced in the attorney's relationship to the insured, where the attorney's
liability to the insured for malpractice in relation to conflict of interest
problems is well established. 47
An attorney also may be liable to the insurer for malpractice claims. 48 The
Supreme Court of Michigan provided an interesting rationale for this liability in
42 See id. at 833-34 (citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Louis A. Roser
Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) and Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d
688, 715-16 (1984)).
43 See KEETON & WDISS, supra note 6, at 834 (citing Norman v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 239 S.E.2d 902, 907 (Va. 1978) (stating that the legal profession's standards "require
undeviating fidelity of a lawyer to his client, and ... an insurer's attorney, employed to
represent an insured, is bound by the same high standards which govern all attorneys, and
owes the insured the same duty as if he were privately retained by the insured.")); see also
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579 (1974); Crum v.
Anchor Cas. Co., 119 N.W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. 1963); Trieber v. Hopson, 277 N.Y.S.2d
241 (1967).
44 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 6, at 835. Even if the attorney does not
voluntarily withdraw, the attorney still may be disqualified from appearing in the case by
the court if the attorney is representing two clients simultaneously and their interests are
adverse. See W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Representation of Conflicting Interests as
Disqualifying Attorney from Acting in a ivil Case, 31 A.L.R.3d 715 (1995); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL REsPoNsiBiLrrY DR 2-110 (1980).
45 See, e.g., Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 75 (1984);
Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 958, 964 (1980); Zalta v.
Billips, 81 Cal. App. 3d 183, 187-88 (1978).
46 See KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 6, at 835.
47 See id. (citing Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 419 A.2d 417 (N.J. Ct. App. 1980));
see also Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 715-16 (1984).
48 See KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 6, at 837-38.
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the case of Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Bell.49 At issue in the case
was whether a defense counsel retained by an insurance company to defend its
insured could be held liable to the insurer for professional malpractice. 50
Although the court stated that the relationship between the insurer and the
attorney did not rise to the level of a traditional attorney-client relationship, 51
the court held that the attorney could be liable to the insurer for professional
malpractice. 52 This holding seemed to conflict with the traditional legal
doctrine, which mandated that only a person in the special privity of the
attorney-client relationship could sue an attorney for malpractice. 53 However,
the court used the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which permits one party to
stand in the place of the other, to remedy that conflict.5 4 In other words, the
court placed the insurer in the place of the insured, who does possess the
appropriate attorney-client relationship with the attorney, thus giving the
insurer the required privity to bring a suit for malpractice against the
attorney. 55 Consequently, an attorney handling insurance defense work could
be held liable to both the insured and the insurer for malpractice if she does not
49 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991).50 See id. at 295.
51 See id. at 297.
52 See id. at 297-99.
53 See id. at 296. The traditional legal doctrine in this area states that only an
individual who has the special privity of the attorney-client relationship can sue an attorney
for malpractice. See Id. Because the court held the attorney was liable to the insurer for
professional malpractice, even though the insurer did not have the requisite privity
relationship with the attorney, the holding appears to conflict with the traditional legal
doctrine.
5 4 See id. at 297-99. Equitable subrogation has been described as a "legal fiction" that
permits one party to stand in the shoes of the other. See id. at 298.
55 See id. at 297-99. The court explained its reasoning for applying this equity
principle as follows:
The doctrine is eminently applicable under the facts of this case. A rule of law
expanding the parameters of the attorney-client relationship in the defense counsel-
insurer context might well detract from the attorney's duty of loyalty to the client in a
potentially conflict-ridden setting. Yet to completely absolve a negligent defense counsel
from malpractice liability would not rationally advance the attorney-client relationship.
Moreover, defense counsel's immunity from suit by the insurer would place the loss for
the attorney's misconduct on the insurer. The only winner produced by an analysis
precluding liability would be the malpracticing attorney. Equity cries out for application
under such circumstances.
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appropriately interpret her responsibilities in dealing with conflict of interest
problems as stated by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
IV. IN-HOUSE COUNSEL EMPLOYED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES: A
DIFFICULT ISSUE CONFRONTING THE CODE
A. Recent Ohio Ethical Opinions Regarding the Proper Scope of
Representation for In-House Counsel Employed by Insurance
Companies
The proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed by an
insurance company is an issue which has been addressed by authorities across
the nation, but no consensus has been reached on the matter.56 Ohio is one
state in particular which has appeared to have a difficult time in dealing with
this problem. In just over a year's time, The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has rendered two opinions on this
issue, providing a different response in each case.57
The hypothetical 58 considered by each opinion involved attorneys
employed by an insurance company which would function within an "in-house
law firm" to pursue subrogation claims for the insurer and to attempt collection
of deductibles from a tortfeasor on behalf of the insureds. 59 These duties would
be in addition to the attorneys' other duties assigned to them as employees of
the insurance company. 60 The question presented could be asked in two parts:
(1) whether it was proper for salaried attorneys employed by an insurance
company (in-house counsel) to pursue subrogation claims against tortfeasors;
and (2) whether it was proper for salaried attorneys employed by an insurance
company (in-house counsel) to attempt collection of deductibles from a
tortfeasor on behalf of insureds with their consent. 61
56 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 5.
5 7 The first opinion, Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9, was rendered on August 12, 1994. The
second opinion, Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, which reversed the first opinion, was rendered
on December 1, 1995.
58 In addition to actual cases, hypotheticals may be submitted to the Board by an
attorney who has questions regarding certain ethical issues which may arise in the course of
his practice. The hypothetical presented here is an example of this type of request for
guidance from the Board by an attorney. See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 8.
59 See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9, at 1.
60 See id. at 2.
61 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 1.
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1. Opinion 94-9
The first opinion rendered by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline was issued on August 12, 1994.62 The Board addressed the
scope of representation issue from the perspective of whether such activities by
an in-house counsel employed by an insurance company created an
unresolvable conflict of interest under the Model63 Code of Professional
Responsibility. 64 The three provisions from the Code upon which the Board
based its decision were DR 5-101, DR 5-105, and Canon 9.65 With regards to
the first part of the question presented, the Board did not find that these three
rules prohibited an in-house counsel from pursuing subrogation claims against
tortfeasors on behalf of the insurer. 66 The Board's reasoning was that through
62 Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9. Up until this point, the scope of representation by an
insurance company's in-house counsel had not been determined by ethics committees or by
court decision in Ohio. Generally, it had been the custom in Ohio for insurance companies
to retain outside counsel to represent insureds in litigation. See id. at 2.
63 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted as the Ohio Code of
Professional Responsibility on October 5, 1970. See OhIo CLE INST., REFERENCE MANUAL
FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM CPR 1 (1990).
64 See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9. The Board chose not to look at this issue from the
perspective of whether these activities would constitute the unauthorized practice of law by
a corporation because the Board felt that it was a decision for the judiciary under Gov. Bar
R. VII § 8(B). See id. at 3. The Board did note, however, that it was a well-established
principle in Ohio that corporations may not practice law. See id. (citing Palmer v.
Westmeyer, 48 Ohio App. 3d 296 (1988) and stating that a corporate officer, who is not an
attorney, may not maintain pro se litigation on behalf of the corporation); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 4705.01 (Baldwin 1991). (It should be noted, however, that a group of licensed
attorneys in Ohio may form a corporation which exclusively practices law. See Gov. Bar R.
IMI § 1.) Although the principle that a corporation may not practice law is well-established,
there is at least one lower court in Ohio which has held that it does not apply to an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company. See Strother v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 14 Ohio
Op. 139, 142 (1939) (holding that an insurance company which under its policy contracts to
defend in the name of, and in behalf of the insured, any and all lawsuits brought against the
insured within the terms of the policy, has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
law suit, and does not engage in the illegal or unauthorized practice of law by employing its
own attorneys to take charge of and direct such litigation or to adjust claims against the
insured); see also infra note 101.
65 See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9, at 3.
66 See id. Subrogation is an equitable remedy that seeks to impose ultimate
responsibility for a wrong or loss on the party who, in equity, should bear it. See Gregory
R. Veal, Subrogation: 771e Duties and Obligations of the Insured and Rights of the Insurer
Revited, 28 TORT & INs. L.I. 69, 69 (1992). The transfer of responsibility is accomplished
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the principles of subrogation, the insurer had actually stepped into the shoes of
the insured in pursuing the claim against the tortfeasor, and therefore, the in-
house attorney was representing the insurer and not the insured. 67
Consequently, because the in-house counsel was actually representing the
insurer in the subrogation claim, no conflict of interest problems arose with the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 68
The Board came out differently, however, with regards to whether it was
proper for salaried attorneys employed by an insurance company to attempt
collection of deductibles from the tortfeasor on behalf of insureds. The Board
stated that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibited an in-
house attorney employed by an insurance company from representing an
insured in seeking collection of the insured's deductible.69 Under Canon 9, the
Board stated that such a representation created an appearance of impropriety
because it was possible that the attorney (employee) would place the welfare of
the insurance company (employer) above the best interests of the insured. 70
Further, the Board stated that under DR 5-101 and DR 5-105, potential and
actual conflicts of interest existed for the in-house counsel. 71 The Board listed
these conflicts of interest as including disputes surrounding coverage, policy
limits, liability, negligence, and settlement issues.72 In the Board's opinion, the
in-house attorney could not adequately represent the interests of the insured and
the insurer, even with full disclosure and consent, and therefore, such a
representation was prohibited by the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. 73
by the fiction that the paying party (subrogee) steps into the shoes of the person who
suffered the loss (subrogor) for the purpose of enforcing the subrogor's rights against the
ultimately responsible party. See id. at 70. Subrogation may arise from contract or by
operation of law. See id. In Ohio, subrogation is considered a derivative right of the insurer,
which is recognized by contract, statute, and case law. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3937.18(E) (Baldwin 1991); McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 45 Ohio St. 3d 27,
29 (1989). Overall, insurers rely on subrogation for reimbursement. See Veal, supra, at 70.67 See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9, at 2.
68 See id. at 5.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. The Board suggested that outside independent counsel should be retained by
the insured, thereby eliminating the employer-employee relationship between the attorney
and the insurance company. See id.
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2. Opinion 95-14
The second opinion rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline was issued on December 1, 1995. 74 This opinion
affirmed the first part of Op. 94-9, stating that an in-house attorney employed
by an insurance company may pursue subrogation claims against a tortfeasor on
behalf of the insurer because such a representation did not conflict with the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 75 However, with regard to the
second part of Op. 94-9, the Board completely reversed itself in Op. 95-14.76
The Board stated that an in-house attorney employed by an insurance company
may represent the insured in the collection of her deductible with the consent of
the insured.77 In order for such a representation to comply with DR 5-101, DR
5-105, and Canon 9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the in-
house attorney "must exercise independent judgment, must disclose to the
insured the employment relationship, must disclose any differing interests, must
inform the insured of options as to representation by outside counsel, and must
discuss whether deductibility of expenses is applicable." 78
The Board went on to state three important reasons why full disclosure and
consent were necessary in the representation of the insured by an in-house
74 Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14.
75 See id. at 3. Once again, the Board stated that the insurer has a derivative right to
stand in the place of the insured and sue any party whom the insured could have sued. See
id. at 4.
76 See id. at 6. The Board in this opinion stated that it withdrew Op. 94-9, issued on
August 12, 1994. See id.
77 See id. The Board acknowledged that under Ohio Department of Insurance Rule
3901-1-54(H)(10) an insurer must include the insured's deductible in its subrogation
demands. The rule states:
An insurer shall include the first party claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation
demands. The insurer shall share any subrogation recovery received on a proportionate
basis with the first party claimant, unless the first party claimant's deductible has been
paid in advance or recovered. The insurer shall not deduct expenses from this amount
except that an outside attorney or collection agency retained to collect such recovery
may be paid a pro rata share of his expenses for collecting this amount.
Id. at 4. It is difficult to determine whether the Board's acknowledgment of this rule is what
led to the reversal of the prior opinion (Op. 94-9) or whether the Board's different
interpretation of the specific provisions of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
actually led to the reversal. As it was not stated specifically by the Board, this dilemma just
adds to the complexity of the issue.
78 See id. at 6.
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attorney employed by an insurance company. First, under DR 5-101(A), full
disclosure of the employment relationship and consent by the insured help
alleviate concerns that the attorney's interests will unknowingly supersede the
insured's interests. 79 Second, under Canon 9, full disclosure of the employment
relationship and consent by the insured protect against any appearance of
impropriety that would exist if the insured was not aware of the employment
relationship between the in-house attorney and the insurer.80 Third, under DR
5-105, potentially conflicting interests exist between the insurer and the insured
which could affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment.8' Thus,
DR 5-105(C) requires consent after full disclosure. 82
As stated, this second opinion rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline reversed Op. 94-9 on the issue of whether an in-
house attorney employed by an insurance company could also represent the
insured in the collection of the deductible.8 3 With these inconsistent opinions, it
is necessary to determine which opinion made the proper interpretation of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility so that attorneys working in the
area of insurance defense will have some guidance on how to approach the
issue. This determination can only be made by first looking at other authorities
across the nation.
B. Opinions Rendered by Other Authorities
The following opinions are a reflection of various decisions which have
been rendered on the proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel
employed by an insurance company. The opinions are grouped according to
whether they hold that an in-house counsel employed by an insurance company
may represent84 or may not represent8 5 an insured.
79 See id. atS.
80 See id.
81 See id. Ethical consideration 5-17 acknowledges this potential conflict. It states that
"[ltypically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests are those in which a
lawyer is asked to represent co-defendants in a criminal case, co-plaintiffs in a personal
injury case, an insured and his insurer, and beneficiaries of the estate of the decedent."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONsIILrrY EC 5-17 (1980) (emphasis added).
82 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RSPONSiBILrrYDR 5-105(C) (1980).
83 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 6.
84 See id.
85 See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9.
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1. In-House Counsel May Represent the Insured
The most recent opinion stating that an in-house counsel employed by an
insurance company may represent an insured was issued by the Supreme Court
of Tennessee in 1995.86 In this decision the court vacated an earlier opinion
rendered by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility. The Board's
opinion stated that it was "improper for in-house attorney employees of an
insurance company to represent individual insureds in legal matters arising
under that company's policy."87 The court held that the Board's decision had
to be vacated because the Board had improperly interpreted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. 88
The court stated that the Code prohibited any relationship between the in-
house attorney, the insurer, and the insured which would create a real and
actual conflict of interest and impair the attorney's loyalty to either the insurer
or the insured.89 The relationship of the employer (insurer) and the employee
(attorney) obviously created the potential for conflicts of interest, but not
necessarily real and actual conflicts of interest.90 Because the Board made its
decision based on the potential for conflicts of interest which could arise in the
relationship between the insurer and the in-house attorney, as opposed to
basing its decision on any real conflicts of interest that were supported by fact,
the Board erred in its interpretation of the Code.91 Consequently, the court held
that it was proper for an in-house attorney employed by an insurance company
to represent an insured as long as no real and actual conflicts of interest existed
which would violate the Code.92
Other authorities also have supported the proposition that an in-house
attorney employed by an insurance company may represent an insured. The
Virginia State Bar stated "that it is not improper for an attorney who is an
employee of an insurance carrier to represent a client who is insured by his
86 In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995).
87 See id. at 327.
88 See id. at 330.
89 See id. at 328.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 330. The court based part of its reasoning on a prior Tennessee case
which stated that "unless and until such an adjudication is made upon an adequate factual
record, each appointment should be examined and a determination made concerning
whether any actual or perceived conflict of interest exists that would prejudice the defense
of the case under consideration." State v. Jones, 726 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Tenn. 1987).
92 See Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d at 330. It seems that a mere potential for a conflict of
interest was not enough to violate the Code. A real and actual conflict must exist before
such a representation by an attorney could be considered a violation.
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employer." 93 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility held that an in-house attorney employed by an insurance
company may represent the insurer in subrogation claims and may represent the
insured in the collection of the deductible. 94 Finally, the Philadelphia Bar
Association rendered an opinion on this issue which stated that an in-house
counsel may represent an insured if all foreseeable conflicts of interest have
been resolved or no longer exist.95
2. In-House Counsel May Not Represent the Insured
A recent decision supporting the proposition that an in-house counsel
employed by an insurance company may not represent the insured was
rendered by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.96 This decision affirmed a
prior opinion of the North Carolina State Bar Association, 97 which stated that
an in-house counsel employed by an insurance company could not represent the
insured in an action brought by a third party that was based on the terms of the
insurance policy98 and that an in-house counsel could not represent an insured
in subrogation claims for property damage.99 The State Bar gave two reasons
for its decision: (1) allowing in-house attorneys to represent insureds would
violate the ban on the practice of law by corporations, and (2) the proposed
representation would result in an increased risk for conflicts of interest which
the State Bar considered to be unacceptable. 100 The court upheld the opinion of
the State Bar stating that the proposed practice of allowing an in-house counsel
employed by an insurance company to represent an insured would constitute
93 Virginia State Bar, Op. 598 (1985).
94 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1370
(1976). The committee further stated that such a representation was appropriate "provided
you make the prescribed disclosure and remain sensitive to any subsequent divergence of
interests of your clients." Id.
95 See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Op. 86-108 (1987). This opinion further stated that an
in-house counsel could also represent the insurer in subrogation claims. See id.
96 Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1986). The state of
North Carolina has taken the strongest stance supporting this proposition.
97 See id. at 518-23; North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. CPR 326 (1982). This
opinion by the North Carolina State Bar affirmed two of its prior opinions. See North
Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. 682 (1969); North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. CPR 19
(1974).
98 See North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. CPR 326 (1982).
99 See id.
100 See Gardner, 341 S.E.2d at 519 (citing North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. CPR
326 (1982)).
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the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation. 10 1 Because the court upheld
the State Bar's opinion based on the theory that this representation constituted
the unauthorized practice of law, the court did not deem it necessary to explore
whether such a representation by an in-house counsel constituted an
unacceptable risk for conflicts of interest. 102
Other authorities have also supported the proposition that an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company may not represent an insured. The
North Carolina State Bar rendered an opinion in which it stated that an in-
house counsel could not pursue a subrogation claim on behalf of the insurer
with the insured as co-plaintiff. 103 The Kansas State Bar Association has held
that an in-house counsel may not represent an insured in actions brought by
third parties involving claims under the insurance policy. 104 Finally, the
101 See Gardner, 341 S.E.2d at 523. As stated supra note 64, The Supreme Court of
Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline did not decide on the issue of
whether an in-house counsel representing an insured constituted the unauthorized practice of
law by a corporation. See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 2. This present opinion by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that such a representation did constitute the
unauthorized practice of law by a corporation. See Gardner, 341 S.E.2d at 523. Other
authorities, however, have taken the contrary position on this issue and have stated that such
a representation by an in-house counsel did not necessarily constitute the unauthorized
practice of law by a corporation. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 951
(Mo. 1987) (holding that such a representation by an in-house counsel of an insured did not
constitute the practice of law by a lay corporation); In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322,
331 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that the mere showing of the employer-employee (i.e., insurer-
attorney) relationship, without a definition of duties, loyalties, prerogatives, and interests of
the parties, was not a sufficient foundation on which to conclude that the attorney-employee
was aiding a non-attorney (insurance company) in the practice of law); California State
Bar, Formal Op. 1987-91 (1988) (stating that an "[i]n-house counsel for an insurer may
represent insureds in litigation without violating the prohibition against aiding the
unauthorized practice of law"; the mere fact that the attorney was an employee of an
insurance company did not necessarily compromise the attorney's independent professional
judgment).
Although there is this split in authorities, it appears that only the states of North
Carolina, Kentucky, and Kansas have held that it was unethical or improper for an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company to represent an insured. See Wfilliam K.
Edwards, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Corporations: North Carolina Holds the
Line, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1422, 1422 n.8 (1987). Consequently, the clear weight of authority,
based on both court rulings and state bar opinions, supports the position that it is ethical for
an in-house counsel employed by an insurance company to represent the insured. See id.
102 See Gardner, 341 S.E.2d at 523.
103 See North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. RPR 151 (1993).
104 See Kansas Bar Ass'n, LEO 83-6 (1983) (agreeing with the views expressed in the
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Kentucky Bar Association has stated that a district adjuster, who is a full-time
salaried employee of a Workmen's Compensation insurer and is also a licensed
attorney, could not handle Workmen's Compensation cases for his employer
due to the inherent conflicts of interest. 105
C. The Ohio Ethical Opinion Which Made the Proper Interpretation of
the Code
As stated before, it is necessary to determine which Ohio Ethics Opinion
made the proper interpretation of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility so that attorneys will have guidance on how properly to proceed
when confronted with this issue. Consequently, when approaching this issue
from the perspective of whether multiple representation of both the insurer and
the insured creates unresolvable conflicts of interest, 10 6 Op. 95-14107 seems
quite clearly to have been the proper interpretation of the Code by The
Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline. The apparent weight of authority, based on court rulings and state
bar considerations, supports the proposition that it is ethical for an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company to represent the insured. 10 8
Authorities, including Op. 95-14, which have supported this proposition
have interpreted the Code to allow such a representation as long as no real
conflicts of interest exist which would affect the attorney's loyalty or
independent professional judgment in representing both the insured and the
insurer.109 Likewise, dual representation is permitted only after the attorney
receives each client's fully informed consent to the joint representation.110 The
North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. CPR 326 (1982)).
105 See Kentucky Bar Ass'n, Unauthorized Practice Op. U-2 (1962).
106 This perspective is the point of view that the Ohio Board chose to take in resolving
the issue of the proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed by an
insurance company. See Ohio Discipline Op. 94-9; Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14. The Board
chose not to look at this issue from the perspective of whether such activities by an in-house
counsel would constitute the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation. See id.
Although, as stated supra note 101, it appears that the majority of authorities have held that
such activities by an in-house counsel do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law by a
corporation. See, e.g., In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 331 (Tenn. 1995).
107 Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14.
108 See Part IV(B); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text. After a thorough
examination of authorities, it appears that no state, with the exceptions of North Carolina,
Kentucky, and Kansas, has held such a representation to be unethical or improper. See
Edwards, supra note 101, at 1422 n.8.
109 See, e.g., Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d at 329-30; Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 5-6.
110 See, e.g., Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 5; Virginia State Bar, Op. 598 (1985);
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informed consent requires the attorney to fully disclose all the facts,
circumstances, and potential conflicts which surround this type of
representation. "'
In addition, an examination of the actual language of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility supports the proposition that an in-house attorney
employed by an insurance company may represent an insured as long as certain
requirements are fulfilled. These requirements state that a lawyer may represent
multiple clients as long as: (1) the lawyer can adequately represent the interests
of each client, (2) the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client is
not adversely affected, and (3) each client consents to the representation after
full disclosure of all matters involved.112 Thus, in analyzing the relevant
authorities and the actual provisions of the Code, it is evident that an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company may represent an insured.
Furthermore, the only real negative authority which has made a finding
contrary to the conclusion that an in-house counsel employed by an insurance
company may represent an insured was Gardner v. North Carolina State
Bar.113 In that case the court held that an in-house counsel employed by an
insurance company could not represent an insured because such a
representation constituted the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation. 114
This holding, however, does not successfully refute the conclusions stated by
the Ohio Board in Op. 95-14 for two reasons.
First, the Gardner decision has gained very little support from jurisdictions
outside the state of North Carolina.115 As a matter of fact, the clear weight of
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1370 (1976).
n1 See, e.g., Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 5; Virginia State Bar, Op. 598 (1985);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1370 (1976).
112 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsiBIrrY DR 5-101(A), DR 5-105(B),
& DR 5-105(C) (1980). It is no mere coincidence that the requirements stated by the
various authorities for joint representation of the insured and the insurer and the
requirements stated here by the Code are nearly identical.
113 341 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1986).
114 See id. at 523. As stated supra notes 101 and 106, this issue has divided authorities
with the clear weight of authorities finding that such a representation by an in-house counsel
does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation. See, e.g.,
Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d at 331.
115 See Edwards, supra note 101, at 1422 n.8. In fact, no other state, with the possible
exceptions of Kansas and Kentucky, has held such a representation to be unethical or
improper. See id. In addition, the Gardner holding has been questioned for its lack of
substantive analysis of the ethical issues surrounding the use of an in-house counsel to
represent an insured and for its failure to address the arbitrary distinction between local and
in-house counsel in the disputed North Carolina statute (CPR 326) which addresses this joint
representation issue. See id. at 1440.
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authorities in other states have held that it is ethical for an in-house counsel
employed by an insurance company to represent the insured. 116 Second, the
North Carolina Supreme Court did not decide the issue from the perspective of
whether such a practice constituted an unacceptable risk for conflicts of
interest; the court only approached the issue from the perspective of whether
such a representation constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 117
Therefore, as the Ohio Board, in Op. 95-14, addressed the issue from only the
conflict of interest perspective, 118 the North Carolina decision made no finding
that was contrary to the Ohio Board's conclusions which were based on the
conflict of interest perspective.119
Consequently, attorneys can look to this Ohio opinion to find guidance on
the proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed by an
insurance company.120 The guidance is that an in-house counsel employed by
an insurance company may represent an insured as long as the attorney (1) can
adequately represent the interests of each client, (2) exercises independent
professional judgment on behalf of each client, (3) discloses the employment
relationship as well as any differing interests to each client, and (4) receives
consent from each client as to the multiple representation. 121
V. THE PROPOSED NEW MODEL STATUTE
Although the Ohio Board's Op. 95-14122 provides some guidance on the
issue of the proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed by
an insurance company, a split in authority still remains on the issue creating a
lack of uniformity across all jurisdictions. This lack of uniformity, in turn,
affects attorneys who are looking for proper guidance on this matter.
Consequently, the solution to this problem is to add a new Ethical
Consideration' 23 to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility which
116 See id. at 1422 n.8; see also Part IV(B); supra note 101 and accompanying text.
117 See Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517, 523 (N.C. 1986).
118 Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 2.
119 See id.
120 An attorney can look to the Ohio Board's opinion for guidance, but she must
remember that the Ohio Board's opinion is not a binding authority in the state of Ohio. See
id. at 8.
121 See id. at 6.122 Id.
123 The Disciplinary Rules do a good job of addressing the conflict of interest issues in
a general manner. Thus, it is not necessary to insert a new Disciplinary Rule that
specifically addresses the proper scope of representation for an in-house counsel employed
by an insurance company. However, because the Disciplinary Rules are general in nature, it
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would state clearly the Code's position on this issue. This solution not only
takes care of the lack of uniformity problem, it also effectively works to give
attorneys clear guidance on the proper scope of representation for an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company. The proposed new Ethical
Consideration states:
EC-25 124 A lawyer employed by an insurance company may represent an
insured in a claim seeking collection of the insured's deductible or in an action
brought by a third party involving terms of the insurance policy as long as (A)
the lawyer can represent adequately the interests of both the insured and the
insurer, (B) the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of both the insured
and the insurer is not adversely affected, and (C) both the insured and the
insurer consent to the multiple representation after full disclosure of all the
potential differing interests.
This proposed new Ethical Consideration fits neatly into the language of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility which states the requirements
for multiple client representation under DR 5-105.125 EC-25 actually proposes
to insert additional language regarding the representation of the insured and
insurer into the already' existing language of DR 5-105.126 Thus, EC-25
provides further guidance to attorneys by stating specifically that the multiple
representation provisions under DR 5-105 may be applied to an in-house
counsel representing both the insured and the insurer.
The language of EC-25 is supported by the various authorities discussed in
Part IV. Specifically, the Ohio Board's Op. 95-14 stated that an in-house
counsel employed by an insurance company may represent the insured as long
as the attorney has received informed consent from each client after full
is necessary to insert a new Ethical Consideration which can provide specific guidance to
attorneys on this issue. Although technically not binding, the Ethical Considerations are
usually reserved for specific guidance on a particular area. Consequently, a new Ethical
Consideration has been proposed here to provide specific guidance on the proper scope of
representation for an in-house counsel employed by an insurance company.
12 4 The proposed new Ethical Consideration should be placed under the subheading
"Interests of Multiple Clients" found after EC 5-13 under Canon 5 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 5
(1980).
125 See MODEL CODE OFPROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILITY DR 5-105 (1980).
126 For example, DR 5-105(3) states that "[a] lawyer shall not continue multiple
employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected." MODEL CODE OF PRoFESsIONAL
RESPONsIBLrrY DR 5-105(B) (1980). EC-25(B) states that a lawyer employed by an
insurance company may represent an insured in a claim as long as the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of both the insured and the insurer is not adversely affected.
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disclosure of all the potential conflicts.127 Therefore, this newly proposed EC-
25 is in accordance with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
authorities which have interpreted its provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Insurance defense representation can prove to be a very difficult task. The
area is wrought with potential conflict of interest problems which evoke
consideration of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The latest
dilemma to emerge for insurance defense attorneys is the proper scope of
representation for an in-house counsel employed by an insurance company.
Although there is still some split in authority, the Ohio Board's Op. 95-14
states what is considered to be the majority view on this issue: an in-house
attorney employed by an insurance company may represent an insured. 128
Ethical Consideration 25 (EC-25), as proposed above, would clarify the
issue by setting forth the exact guidelines that an in-house attorney employed
by an insurance company should follow in representing both the insured and
the insurer. Consequently, even though the proper scope of representation for
an in-house counsel still remains in dispute, the in-house counsel can rest
assured that there is some quality guidance to be found regarding his ethical
responsibilities in handling this issue.
127 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 6; see also In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322,
330 (Tenn. 1995).
128 See Ohio Discipline Op. 95-14, at 6.
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